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The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts
with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection
Dawn E. Johnsen
Our legal system historically has treated the fetus as part of the woman
bearing it and has afforded it no rights as an entity separate from her. A
few exceptions to this general rule have been created where necessary to
protect the interests of born individuals. In recent years, however, courts
and state legislatures have increasingly granted fetuses rights traditionally
enjoyed by persons. Some of these recent "fetal rights" differ radically
from the initial legal recognition of the fetus in that they view the fetus as
an entity independent from the pregnant woman with interests that are
potentially hostile to hers. In 'extreme cases, the state has curtailed the
autonomy of women during pregnancy to further what were perceived as
adverse fetal interests. For example, women have been compelled to sub-
mit to surgery in the form of cesarean sections although they preferred to
deliver their children through vaginal childbirth. Similarly, a state court
has held that a child may sue her or his mother for injuries resulting from
the woman's actions during pregnancy.
The social determination of how the legal system should view the fetus
should be informed by a careful consideration of all potential implica-
tions.1 Although the desire to provide legal protection to the fetus often
1. This decision is a social one, not dictated by biology. A scientific inquiry reveals only that thefetus is a living entity, as are the egg and the sperm that combine to form the fetus, which has the
potential to develop into a recognizable person given approximately nine months of nurturing in the
woman's womb. The legal status that society chooses to confer upon the fetus is dependent upon the
goals being pursued and the effect of such status on competing values. In the course of defining the
word "alive," Professor Arthur Leff offered an insightful and concise discussion of the relevant consid-
erations in determining under what circumstances the fetus should be considered a legal person:
Important to all these legal problems is the recognition that they are legal (and ethical)
problems, dependent not on any deceptively 'natural' biological definition of life, but on social
and legal decisions. In 'nature,' things just are; only people classify. . . .[Tihe relevant legal
question ought not to be whether a foetus is 'alive' or 'a person' from the moment of concep-
tion, or the moment of viability, etc., as if the question were one of natural rather than social
decision. A legal decision will still have to be made to whom the law ought to give protection
and at what cost, paid by who[m] . . ..
Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 1997 (1985) (emphasis in
original).
See also Grobstein, A Biological Perspective on the Origin of Human Life and Personhood, in
DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 3, 10-11 (M. Shaw & A.E. Doudera eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as DEFINING HUMAN LIFE] ("[S]uch matters as social status,
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reflects a number of important concerns, the recent expansion of fetal
rights has not been accompanied by careful consideration of how best to
address those concerns. Most ominously, this expansion has ignored the
far-reaching implications for women as the bearers of fetuses.
By creating an adversarial relationship between the woman and her
fetus, the state provides itself with a powerful means for controlling
women's behavior during pregnancy, thereby threatening women's funda-
mental rights. A woman's right to bodily autonomy in matters concerning
reproduction is protected by the constitutional guarantees of liberty and
privacy. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the laws should be interpreted to prohibit the state from
using women's reproductive capability to their detriment. Any legal recog-
nition of the fetus should be scrutinized to ensure that it does not infringe
on women's constitutionally protected interests in liberty and equality
during pregnancy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS
A. Unified Interests: Fetal Rights Contingent Upon Live Birth and
Against Third Parties
Until recently, the law did not recognize the existence of the fetus ex-
cept for a few very specific purposes. As the Supreme Court stated in
1973 in Roe v. Wade,2 "the unborn have never been recognized in the law
rights, and obligations associated with personhood move outside the particular concerns of science and
become aspects of social structure and policy, subject to the dynamics of value and legal systems,
rational discourse, and political determination."); Wilder, Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical
Perspective, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE, supra, at 12, 16 (resolution passed by National Academy of
Science states that point at which life begins is "a question to which science can provide no answer").
Legal personhood is a status conferred by the courts or by a legislature and differs greatly from our
everyday sense of what personhood signifies. For example, the Supreme Court has held that corpora-
tions are "persons" for some legal purposes. E.g., Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S.
394 (1886) (corporations protected as legal persons by Fourteenth Amendment). Recognition of these
rights is not the result of "some theory that ensoulment occurs at the moment of incorporation" or of
the corporation's "startlingly human form." Baron, The Concept of Person in the Law, in DEINING
HUMAN LIFE, supra, at 121, 125. Rather, justice to the persons connected with the corporation was
thought to require a recognition of the corporation as a legal person. Absent such compelling need,
however, the Court has denied the corporation status as a legal person. E.g., Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85 (1974) (privilege against compulsory self-incrimination limited to natural persons). The
considerations relevant for the question of whether to create fetal personhood obviously are very dif-
ferent from those for corporate personhood; yet in both contexts legal status should be a "function of
the different social policies being advanced by different areas of the law." Id. at 128.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held in Roe that a fetus, even when viable, is not a
person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 158. It held further that a woman's right to choose,
in consultation with her physician, whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is protected by the
constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 152-53. Although the Court found that the state has a compel-
ling interest in the "potentiality of human life" of the fetus after it reaches viability, it concluded that
this interest could not justify prohibiting an abortion even after the point of viability if the abortion is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 162-63.
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as persons in the whole sense," 3 and the law has been reluctant to afford
any legal rights to fetuses "except in narrowly defined situations and ex-
cept when the rights are contingent upon live birth."4 The limited con-
texts in which courts first recognized the fetus involved rights that were
granted to children. These rights of children were unique in that they
required acknowledging a child's prior existence as a fetus in her or his
mother's womb. Yet because they contained a live birth requirement, these
narrow exceptions were consistent with the prevailing view of the fetus as
part of the woman. The fetus was not given any rights independent of its
mother; rather, it was only after the fetus became a person at birth that it
acquired legal rights as a separate entity.
One of these first instances of legal recognition of the fetus involved the
right of inheritance.5 Where a fetus existed at the time of death of the
testator, the fetus was granted the status of a person for the limited pur-
poses of the inheritance, provided that it was subsequently born alive. Fe-
tuses were vested with inheritance rights contingent upon live birth in
recognition of parents' presumed desire to provide for children conceived
but not yet born at the time of their death.'
In another relatively early example of fetal recognition, tort law began
looking to the period prior to birth in order to allow a cause of action for
prenatal injuries. Before 1946, courts refused to recognize tort claims
brought by children for injuries inflicted prior to birth.7 Today, however,
virtually all American jurisdictions allow tort claims for prenatal injuries
if the child is subsequently born alive.' The purpose of tort law is to
provide compensation to victims of tortious conduct and, to a lesser extent,
3. Id. at 162.
4. Id. at 161.
5. See, e.g., Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A. 414 (1887); Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520,
136 S.E. 551 (1927); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899); see also Uniform
Probate Code § 2-108 (1969) ("Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereaf-
ter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.").
6. See Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C. 537, 538, 137 S.E. 596, 597 (1927) (recognition of fetuses
"apparently was based upon the presumed oversight or inadvertence of the parent in providing for an
existing or a contingent situation"); see also Baron, The Concept of Person in the Law, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE, supra note 1, at 128 ("Prime among the goals of the laws of inheritance is fulfillment
of the presumed intentions of the testator.").
This recognition of the fetus has been the exception rather than the rule, even for property law.
See, e.g., In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959) (holding fetus not
a person for purposes of § 23 of New York Personal Property Law and distinguishing distinctive
purposes served by "fiction" of considering fetus subsequently born alive a person for certain matters
of property and tort law).
7. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (first case recognizing cause of action by
child for injuries received in utero after viability). For an example of the law prior to Bonbrest, see
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (no cause of action for prenatal injuries).
8. W. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
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to deter such harmful acts.9 It is consistent with these purposes to allow a
child to recover against third parties for afflictions she or he presently
suffers as a result of tortious conduct inflicted on the pregnant woman. In
recognizing born plaintiffs' rights to sue for injuries suffered prenatally,
tort law provides a means of compensating children and their parents. 10
The law of fetal rights in its first phase thus did not afford rights to the
fetus qua fetus. It did not conceive of the fetus as separate from the wo-
man, but took legal cognizance of the fact that the woman was pregnant.
Recognition of the existence of the fetus as part of the pregnant woman
was necessary in these instances to protect the interests of born persons,
both the subsequently born child and her or his parents. This recognition
created no conflicts with the interests of pregnant women.
B. The Creation of Independent Interests: The Recent Expansion of Fe-
tal Rights
1. Erosion of Live Birth Requirement
Since the Roe decision, the law increasingly has recognized the fetus in
contexts that are not contingent upon subsequent live birth. A majority of
states now consider fetuses that have died in utero to be "persons" under
wrongful death statutes." Similar developments have occurred in criminal
law. According to traditional common law, the destruction of a fetus in
utero is not a homicide; the alleged victim must have been "born alive."1
12
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently became the first
American court to break with this long line of precedent. It held that a
fetus was a person for purposes of the Massachusetts vehicular homicide
statute, and thus a potential homicide victim. 3 In addition, a number of
states have adopted legislation imposing criminal sanctions for the destruc-
tion of a fetus that are identical to those imposed for the murder of a
person.1
4
9. Id. at § 4.
10. See Note, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4 HOFSrRA L. REv.
805, 825 (1976) ("The intention in granting recovery in cases of [prenatal injury] is. . .to compen-
sate the postnatal child for the affliction it must bear. Recovery is not, therefore, a recognition that the
prenatal child has legal rights.").
11. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, at 370 & n.32 (listing states); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975) (same); see also infra notes 15-17.
12. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984) ("Since at least the fourteenth
century, the common law has been that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a homicide. . . .The
rule has been accepted as the established common law in every American jurisdiction that has consid-
ered the question.").
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1986) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); Mic-. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West
1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1974); OQLA. STAT.
Vol. 95: 599, 1986
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The creation of fetal rights not contingent upon subsequent live birth
reflects a legitimate desire to protect the rights of the pregnant woman
and the expectant father. Recognizing fetuses in wrongful death actions
serves to compensate parents for the loss of their expected child and to
protect the interests of a woman who has chosen to carry her pregnancy to
term.15 Such recognition also seeks to deter and punish the tortious con-
duct."6 Similarly, feticide laws use the criminal law to protect pregnant
women from physical attack and from the harm of having their
pregnancies involuntarily and violently terminated by third parties. Hold-
ing third parties responsible for the negligent or criminal destruction of
fetuses is therefore consistent with, and even enhances, the protection of
pregnant women's interests.
Yet the form that this legal recognition often takes creates the potential
for the future expansion of fetal rights in ways that conflict with women's
interests. By sometimes identifying the fetus rather than the woman as the
locus of the right when there is no live birth, recent laws have reflected a
dangerous conceptual move.1 7 The law no longer recognizes the fetus only
ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.32.060 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982).
15. As noted by Prosser and Keeton, women traditionally have been allowed to recover damages
"for their own injuries caused by miscarriage," but not "for the loss of the child." PossER & KEE-
TON, supra note 8, at 369 n.30. The Supreme Court has described wrongful death actions for the
destruction of a fetus as filling this gap and providing compensation for the loss of a child:
In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some states permit the par-
ents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries.
Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus
consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
A number of state courts have recognized wrongful death actions for the destruction of fetuses for
the explicit purpose of compensating parents. E.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 574, 651 P.2d 11,
15 (1982) ("It is clear, therefore, that [the wrongful death statute] confers upon parents a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a 'child' and thus protects the rights and interests of the parents, and
not those of the decedent child."); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Iowa 1983)(distinguishing between claim by estate of fetus under state's survival statute under which "the wrong
is done to the injured person and to that person's estate," and claim by parents for loss of fetus under
wrongful death statute under which "the wrong is done to a child's parents," and concluding, "[w]hat
is involved here is a right of recovery given to a parent. The parent's loss does not depend on the legal
status of the child ... ).
16. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So.2d 354, 357 (1974) (allowing suit
for wrongful death of fetus "because the punitive nature of our wrongful death statute demands the
punishment of the tortfeasor"); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 142-43, 425 A.2d
92, 95 (1980) ("Under such a rule, there is the absurd result that the greater the harm, the better the
chance of immunity, and the tort-feaser could foreclose his own liability.").
17. E.g., Eich, 293 Ala. at 99, 300 So.2d at 357 (citing "state's interest and general obligation to
protect life"); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633, 639 (La. 1981) (citing legislative pronouncement
that "a human being exists from the moment of fertilization and implantation); Amadio v. Levin, No.
106, slip op. at J-15-9 (Pa. Dec. 4, 1985) ("This Court's former view that the real objective of these
lawsuits was to compensate the parents of their deceased children . . . is not only incorrect, but if
accepted, merely perpetuates the notion that a child is inseparable from its mother while en ventre sa
mere."); Vaillancourt, 139 Vt. at 142, 425 A.2d at 94 ("A viable unborn child, is, in fact, biologically
speaking, a presently existing person and a living human being. ... ); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.
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in those cases where it is necessary to protect the interests of the subse-
quently born child and her or his parents. Rather, the law has conferred
rights upon the fetus qua fetus. Conceptualizing the fetus as an entity
with legal rights independent of the pregnant woman has made possible
the future creation of fetal rights that could be used against the pregnant
woman. In some instances, this potential has already been realized.
2. Fetal Rights Against Pregnant Women
a. Existing Rights
In one such case, a Michigan court held that a child could sue his
mother for taking tetracycline during her pregnancy, allegedly resulting in
the discoloration of the child's teeth.18 The court stated that the appropri-
ate standard for liability was that of the "reasonable" pregnant woman. 9
Another court has suggested that a woman may be sued by her child for
not preventing its birth if she had prior knowledge of the probability of its
being born "defective." '2 0 In some states, a woman can be deprived of cus-
tody of her child even before its birth if the state feels that her actions
during pregnancy endanger the fetus. 21 In Michigan, a state whose laws
do not expressly extend to "prenatal abuse," a court held that evidence of
a woman's prenatal "abuse" or "neglect" could be considered during pro-
ceedings instituted by the state to deprive her of custody of her newborn
child.22 The court further held that this evidence could be obtained by
reviewing the woman's medical records without her consent, records
whose confidentiality was protected by both federal and state statutes.
California's criminal child abuse statute, which requires a parent "to fur-
nish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance," extends to
fetuses and imposes a criminal penalty of up to one year in jail and a two
Va. 431, 438-39, 184 S.E.2d 428, 432 (1971) (holding fetus is a person for wrongful death statute is
"technically correct in view of the fact that 'biologically speaking' such a child is, in fact, a presently
existing person, a living human being") (quoting Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 226
(S.D. W. Va. 1969)).
18. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
19. Id. at 400-02, 301 N.W.2d. at 870-71.
20. The court saw "no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answer-
able for the pain, suffering, and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring." Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980) (dictum).
21. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981):
Whenever it shall appear that any child within this State is of such circumstances that his
welfare will be endangered unless proper care or custody is provided, an application. . . may
be filed . . . seeking that the Bureau of Childrens Services accept and provide such care or
custody of such child as the circumstances may require . . . .The provisions of this section
shall be deemed to include an application on behalf of an unborn child ....
22. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (within twenty-four hours of
birth, child began exhibiting signs of drug withdrawal).
Vol. 95: 599, 1986
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thousand dollar fine.23 Perhaps most alarmingly, states have taken direct
injunctive action against pregnant women. Courts have seized custody of
fetuses (i.e., of pregnant women) in order to enjoin women from taking
drugs that are potentially harmful to fetuses.24 They have ordered women
to submit to blood transfusions to benefit the fetus,25 and have even com-
pelled women against their wishes to undergo cesarean sections instead of
vaginal delivery. 26
b. Potential Expansion
The creation of fetal rights that can be used to the detriment of preg-
nant women is a very recent phenomenon, and thus far has occurred in
only a relatively small number of cases. Yet, absent an increased aware-
ness of the costs to women's autonomy, these rights will almost certainly
continue to expand.2 7 Given the fetus's complete physical dependence on
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1986) ("A child conceived but not yet born is to be
deemed an existing person insofar as this section is concerned.").
24. See Chicago Trib., Apr. 9, 1984, at I, col. 4 (reporting Champaign County judge's order
designating fetus ward of state as result of "abuse" by its mother in form of her heroin habit); see also
Reyes v. State, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977) (criminal charge brought against
woman for endangering fetus by using heroin during pregnancy; court held relevant statute applied
only to children, not fetuses); Boston Globe, Apr. 27, 1983, at 8, col. 1 (reporting physician's request
for court to order testing of pregnant woman for drug abuse and to take "what steps are necessary to
insure the fetus's proper development").
25. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (woman objected to blood transfusion on religious grounds). This case,
however, was decided prior to the Court's establishment of the constitutional right to privacy in repro-
ductive matters. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); infra note 75 (citing cases).
26. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (per curiam)
(woman objected to surgery on religious grounds); Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest
Cut of All, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16 (reporting two additional cases in which
women were ordered to undergo cesarean sections).
27. Strong forces are currently encouraging this expansion and are not balanced by a considera-
tion of the competing values. Several amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been proposed that
would explicitly grant fetuses rights as "persons" under the Constitution. E.g., S.J. Res. 17, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.J. Res. 62, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) ("Section 1. With respect to the
right to life the word 'person' as used in this article and in the fifth and fourteenth articles of amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States applies to all human beings ... including their unborn
offspring at every stage of their biological development."). Similar statutes have been introduced by
which Congress, without amending the Constitution, would attempt to define "person" as including
fetuses for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. 24,141-42 (1981) ("Section 1. (a) The Congress finds that the life of each human being begins
at conception. (b) The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States protects all human beings."). For further examples of this type of legislation, see
Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential Reach of a Human Life Amendment, 8 Am. J.L. & MED.
97, 97-102 (1982); Hyde, The Human Life Bill: Some Issues and Answers, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
1077, 1077-78 (1982). Senator Orrin Hatch has recently proposed an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that would extend its coverage to fetuses, thereby providing them with civil rights. S. 522,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S2262-64 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1985). Statutes creating "fetal
personhood" under the law have also been proposed in a number of state legislatures. See, e.g., Memo
from Sandra Kurjiaka, ACLU of Arkansas, to Leadership of Pro-Choice Organizations, Emergency
Assistance to Defeat the Arkansas Unborn Child Amendment (Aug. 16, 1984) (on file with author).
Furthermore, a number of legal commentators have recently called for an expansion of fetal rights
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and interrelatedness with the body of the woman, virtually every act of the
pregnant woman has some effect on the fetus. A woman could be held
civilly or criminally liable for fetal injuries caused by accidents resulting
from maternal negligence, such as automobile or household accidents. She
could also be held liable for any behavior during her pregnancy having
potentially adverse effects on her fetus,28 including failing to eat prop-
erly,29 using prescription, nonprescription and illegal drugs,3" smoking,3
drinking alcohol,3 2 exposing herself to infectious disease3 3 or to workplace
without paying adequate attention to the potential infringements on women's liberty. See, e.g., King,
The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REv.
1647, 1687 (1979) ("There are no serious legal problems to recognizing legal protection of viable
fetuses equal to that already afforded newborns."); Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protect-
ing the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 257 (1982) (advocating more extensive legal
protection of the fetus, including legal rights assertable against woman bearing the fetus); Walker &
Puzder, State Protection of the Unborn After Roe v. Wade: A Legislative Proposal, 13 STESaON L.
REv. 237, 240-41 (1984) (advocating passage of legislation granting "to unborn children, from the
moment of conception, the basic rights, immunities, and protections available to all other persons,
subject only to such limitations as are mandated by the Constitution of the United States"); Note,
Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 47, 90 (1978) ("The parents'
rights to autonomy should be limited when they conflict with the right of the child to be born
whole."). Several of the relatively few commentators who have acknowledged that extensive, unprece-
dented restrictions on women's autonomy would result have nevertheless advocated expanded fetal
rights. See, e.g., Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 67-69
(1984) ("It will take courage to reverse the well-established legal presumption that the mother's rights
transcend those of the fetus."); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437 (1983) ("Once she decides to forgo abortion and the
state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty to act in ways that would adversely
affect the fetus."). Members of the medical community have advocated similar proposals. See infra
note 46 and accompanying text.
In contrast, however, several commentators have written convincingly of the dangers of an unthink-
ing expansion of fetal rights. See Westfall, supra; Parness, Social Commentary: Values and Legal
Personhood, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 487 (1981); see also infra note 97.
28. The following examples, cited in notes 29-38 and accompanying text, were offered by com-
mentators advocating the imposition of liability or state regulation on pregnant women.
29. Substandard nutrition during pregnancy may result in low birth weight, which causes higher
incidence of defects, such as impairment of fetal brain development, and mortality. See Note, supra
note 27, at 73 ("Nutrition is the single most important exogenous influence in the life of the fetus.").
30. For example, cough medicines may cause congenital goiter or skeletal, liver or brain damage;
antacids and laxatives may cause kidney and brain damage; quinine and its derivatives may cause
deafness; aspirin may cause damage to the nervous system, kidneys and liver; heroin may cause pre-
maturity, deformity or death. See id. at 73-74.
31. Smoking reduces the fetus's oxygen supply, which is correlated with low birth weight, prema-
turity and perinatal mortality. "Indeed, a single cigarette smoked by a pregnant woman can disrupt
the fetus' heartbeat." See id. at 74.
32. Heavy alcohol use may result in fetal alcohol syndrome, which "consists of growth retarda-
tion, facial anomalies, mental retardation, and assorted congenital defects affecting other organs." See
Shaw, supra note 27, at 73. There is some evidence that the fetus may be adversely affected by even
very small amounts of alcohol, see id. at 73, and by heavy alcohol use that occurred even prior to
pregnancy, see Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal
Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325, 360-61 (1984).
33. For example, diabetes in the mother may cause cerebral palsy with mental retardation; con-
genital syphilis may cause blindness, retardation, and birth defects; and genital herpes may cause
brain damage. All may cause fetal death. See Shaw, supra note 27, at 67-69. In addition, maternal
mumps, scarlet fever, malaria, small pox, chickenpox, measles and rubella all have potential adverse
effects on fetal development. See Note, supra note 27, at 74 n.227.
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hazards, 34 engaging in immoderate exercise or sexual intercourse,", resid-
ing at high altitudes for prolonged periods,"6 or using a general anesthetic
or drugs to induce rapid labor during delivery. 7 If the current trend in
fetal rights continues, pregnant women would live in constant fear that
any accident or "error" in judgment could be deemed "unacceptable" and
become the basis for a criminal prosecution by the state or a civil suit by a
disenchanted husband or relative.38
34. Exposure of the pregnant woman to teratogenic substances may result in harm to the fetus,
including brain damage, behavioral disturbances, growth retardation, and gross birth defects. Accord-
ing to Dr. Shaw, "Exposure to organic or inorganic compounds in the chemical industry, dry-cleaning
establishments, and gasoline stations are particularly suspect." See Shaw, supra note 27, at 70. Em-
ployers are excluding fertile women from working near teratogenic chemicals, claiming concern for
their own financial or moral liability for causing birth defects. Some women have been faced with the
"choice" of losing their jobs or undergoing sterilization. See Westfall, supra note 27, at 121. For an
intelligent discussion of the problem of fetal hazards in the workplace as they affect women's employ-
ment rights, see Note, Getting Beyond Discrimination: A Regulatory Solution to the Problem of Fetal
Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577 (1986).
35. Late in a pregnancy, exercise or sexual intercourse may cause premature labor due to trauma.
See Note, supra note 27, at 75 & n.234. Furthermore, a study by Dr. Richard Naeye, Chairperson of
the Department of Pathology at Pennsylvania State University found that "[a] pregnant woman's
engaging in sexual intercourse is more dangerous to the fetus than the combined effects of her use of
alcohol and cigarets [sic] . . . due to a bacterial infection known as chorioamnionitis which is appar-
ently transmitted to the womb by semen." Chicago Trib., June 13, 1981, at 22, col. 1.
36. See Note, supra note 27, at 75.
37. These activities reduce the fetus's oxygen supply, and thus may cause cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
lowered intelligence or mental illness. See id. at 75 & n.236.
38. Were prenatal tort claims against the mother widely recognized, courts would probably hold
pregnant women to the standard of a "reasonable pregnant woman." See Grodin v. Grodin, 102
Mich. App. 396, 400-02, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870-71 (1980). The woman would be required to have
knowledge of the potential risks of her behavior at least equal to the typical person in the community.
If she had superior knowledge, she would have a duty to act according to that higher standard. The
converse, however, would not be true: Courts would apply the community standard if she had inferior
knowledge. See Beal, supra note 32, at 353-58.
A number of commentators have written approvingly of this development and have encouraged
courts to allow such suits. See Note, supra note 27, at 84 ("Given that the child's right to sue his
parents in negligence has already been established in many jurisdictions, no purpose would be served
by singling out and denying the proposed cause of action [of a child prenatally injured by parental
negligence].") (footnote omitted); Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a Child Against
Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 609 (1976) (pregnant woman should be held to standard of
gross negligence).
In the course of advocating greatly expanded legal restrictions on the actions of pregnant women,
Dr. Shaw describes what might be expected of a "reasonable pregnant woman." Her "prenatal du-
ties" would include "regular prenatal checkups, a balanced diet with vitamin, iron, and calcium sup-
plementation, weight control, and judicious use of medications, tobacco, and caffeine. Alcohol and
narcotic use in pregnancy should be avoided entirely." Shaw, supra note 27, at 83. In addition,
"[niegligent exposure to noxious chemicals and drugs, refusal to accept genetic counseling and prena-
tal diagnosis, refusal to obtain prenatal therapy, or failure to provide a modified diet, could give rise to
a cause of action." Id. at 95. In some high-risk cases, Dr. Shaw would find women negligent for not
taking affirmative actions to minimize risks to the fetus even before they could possibly have known
that they were pregnant. Id. at 83-84. Finally, if a woman gave birth at home using a midwife after a
physician strongly recommended hospital delivery, "she could be liable for fetal neglect." Id. at 89.
In the criminal context Dr. Shaw has stated that "health care professionals and others could be
required, by properly drawn statutes, to report both potential and actual fetal abuse." Shaw, supra
note 27, at 100 (emphasis in original). In Massachusetts, given the holding in Commonwealth v. Cass
that a viable fetus is a person for purposes of the state's vehicular homicide statute, a woman whose
reckless driving results in the loss of her late pregnancy may be subject to prosecution for homicide.
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In addition to advocating expansion of criminal penalties and tort re-
covery, commentators have advocated a wide range of new forms of state
regulation of pregnant women's behavior. One such suggestion is that
public benefits be withheld from pregnant women who refuse to submit to
physical examinations or to abstain from drugs or alcohol. 39 "High risk"
parents could be required to undergo genetic or post-conception screen-
ing.4" Pregnant women could be prohibited from drinking alcohol and re-
quired to submit to breathalyzer tests to ensure compliance. 4' One com-
mentator has even proposed allowing punitive damages against women
who intentionally harm their fetuses.'
Perhaps the most foreboding aspect of allowing increased state involve-
ment in pregnant women's lives in the name of the fetus is that the state
may impose direct injunctive regulation of women's actions. When ex-
panded to cover fetuses, child custody provisions may be used as a basis
for seizing custody of the fetus to control the woman's behavior. As noted
by one commentator, "[t]he principal difficulty with the state taking cus-
tody of a conceived but unborn child is that the mother herself necessarily
is taken into custody." 43 This fact forcefully demonstrates the threat to
women's autonomy inherent in the creation of any fetal right that treats
the fetus as an entity independent from the woman. Nevertheless, advo-
cates of fetal rights have proposed that the state increasingly take custody
of fetuses and, in some cases, civilly commit pregnant women to "protect"
their fetuses.
44
This threat appears particularly immediate in the area of coerced medi-
cal treatment of pregnant women. Women already have been compelled to
submit to blood transfusions and cesarean sections against their will, when
it was believed to be in the interest of the fetus. 45 This phenomenon,
troubling in its own right, is susceptible to even more dangerous expan-
467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). It would be difficult to make an exception for the pregnant woman under
Cass given its blanket holding that the fetus is a legal person with rights completely independent from
those of the woman.
39 Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. Rxv.
1051, 1051-53 (1981).
40. Id.
41. Shaw, supra note 27, at 74, 103.
42. Id. at 104.
43. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 27, at 294.
44. For example, the commentators who observed that taking a fetus into custody would neces-
sarily entail taking a pregnant woman into custody nevertheless strongly advocate doing just that. Id.
("The failure of states to use child custody provisions on a wide scale to compel conduct benefitting
the conceived unborn is both perplexing and troubling."); see also Shaw, supra note 27, at 89 ("[A]n
alcoholic or an addict could be institutionalized for the specific purpose of protecting the fetus.");
Note, supra note 39, at 1051-52 ("A more effective means of preventing prenatal injury [than al-
lowing tort suits against mother for prenatal injuries] would be for states to intervene in prenatal
health care by imposing requirements or restrictions on expectant mothers.") (footnote omitted).
45. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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sion given new procedures in fetal therapy and fetal surgery. When fully
developed, these procedures, which had promised to enhance women's re-
productive freedom, may be used to restrict it. Some in the medical profes-
sion advocate compulsory medical treatment, including forced surgery,
where it is determined by medical professionals to be in the interest of the
fetus.46 The threat to women's autonomy is intensified by the fact that
fetal therapy is still in the very early stages of development and, as one
physician has noted: "Excessive enthusiasm, combined with inexperience,
can be dangerous. Eager to learn and refine these procedures, physicians
and surgeons may rush ahead." '
C. Expansionary Forces
1. Careless Lawmaking
The threat to the autonomy of pregnant women posed by the expansion
of fetal rights has been largely unintentional. When making laws that
involve fetuses and pregnant women, courts (as well as legislatures) have
felt constrained by the existing law as developed for born persons and
have considered the granting of fetal rights an all-or-nothing proposition.
46. See, e.g., Leiberman, Mazor, Chaim & Cohen, The Fetal Right to Live, 53 OBsTETRIcs &
GYNECOLOGY 515, 517 (1979) ("If. . . the patient does not consent to undergo a given treatment
directed to save the fetus, and which involves no undue risk to the patient, the doctor must be legally
entitled to warn the patient that she is committing a felony."). Others argue against allowing physi-
cians or the state to interfere with the wishes of the pregnant woman concerning medical treatment,
pointing out that if such intrusion were permitted, fetal therapy might "foreclose current options,
rather than create new ones." Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1982, at 10, 11. See also Shriner, Maternal Versus Fetal Rights-A Clinical Dilemma, 53
OBsTETics & GYNECOLOGY 518, 519 (1979) ("There is no acceptable alternative to requiring the
woman's consent to surgery, and the obstetrician's role must remain one of informing, counseling, and
persuading. . . .). For further discussion of the potential conflicts created between the interests of the
pregnant woman and the fetus by viewing the fetus as a separate patient, see Lenow, The Fetus as a
Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J.L. & MFD. 1, 15-29 (1983); Ryan, Medical Impli-
cations of Bestowing Personhood on the Unborn, in DEFINING HuMAN LIFE, supra note 1, at 84.
47. Shriner, supra note 46, at 10. Even in cases involving well-established medical procedures,
decisions about whether and how to proceed should be left to the woman. Because choices about
medical treatment necessarily involve a consideration of competing concerns, the law should encourage
physicians to disclose fully the potential risks and benefits of the procedure to enable the woman to
make an informed choice. Despite the physician's presumed competence to inform the patient of the
possible results of the medical treatment, the physician is not capable of making the required value
choices for the woman. See Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 270-72 (1985). Furthermore, the physician's professional opinion is not
always definitive. It is significant that in two of the very few reported cases where cesarean sections
were ordered against the woman's consent (but never performed), the cesareans were later found to be
unnecessary for the health of the fetuses, both of which were born through vaginal delivery without
injury. Annas, supra note 26, at 16. Similarly, subsequent to a court ordering his client to submit to a
blood transfusion, an attorney expressed his belief that the transfusion was not, in fact, medically
necessary: "In point of fact an order was made against this woman when there was no serious prob-
lem at all. Two young resident doctors imagined that something might happen. A one-pint blood
transfusion for an adult person is never justified. It is simply placing her in a state of risk with no
correlative value." Letter from Glen How to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (May
16, 1967), quoted in Lenow, supra note 46, at 20 n.119.
The Yale Law Journal
They have mistakenly viewed their options as being limited to either
granting the fetus personhood status without regard to either the context
or the parties involved, or denying the very existence of the fetus. It is
thus not surprising that these lawmakers have extended the rights of per-
sons to fetuses when faced with instances of clear harm and injustice, such
as when an assailant negligently or willfully destroys a fetus through vio-
lence to a pregnant woman.
Courts have also employed unnecessarily simplistic reasoning when
adopting the other extreme and refusing to recognize the existence of the
fetus at all. For example, in denying a wrongful death action by a fetus,
one court stated that it was "incongruous" to allow a woman the constitu-
tional right to abort and yet hold a third party liable to the fetus for
unintended but merely negligent acts."8 Another court denied a child's
wrongful life claim against a physician out of fear that allowing it would
necessitate holding liable for wrongful life women who had knowledge of
probable fetal defects yet chose not to abort.49 Similarly, in limiting a feti-
cide statute to the destruction of viable fetuses (where the statute on its
face made no such distinction), the California Supreme Court stated: "If
destruction of a nonviable fetus were susceptible to classification as the
taking of human life and therefore murder, then the mother no more than
the father would have the right to take human life." '
In thus treating the fetus, courts have glossed over crucial differences
between fetuses and persons, and have lost sight of the interests that nar-
row legal recognition of the fetus traditionally has attempted to protect.
They have ignored alternatives to equating the fetus with a person that
would have more appropriately served their goals. In some cases, they
have too quickly applied the legal status of the fetus in one context to
entirely new contexts,51 and in others they have unnecessarily refused to
48. Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 679, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (1980); see also Toth v. Goree,
65 Mich. App. 296, 304, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1975) ("There would be an inherent conflict in
giving the mother the right to terminate the pregnancy yet holding that an action may be brought on
behalf of the same fetus under the wrongful death act.") (footnote omitted).
49. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (denying claim for wrongful life against
physician reasoning that "'[i]mplicit, beyond this claim against a physician for faulty advice, is the
proposition that a pregnant woman who, duly informed, does not seek an abortion, and all who urge
her to see the pregnancy through, are guilty of wrongful injury to the fetus' ") (quoting Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, J., dissenting)).
50. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1976).
51. In Commonwealth v. Cass, for example, the court relied on a prior decision that a fetus could
bring a wrongful death action as the basis for holding that a fetus could be the legal victim of a
homicide in the absence of a feticide statute or any evidence of legislative intent to include fetuses
under the homicide statute. 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). Given the very different goals and effects of tort
law and criminal law, and the absence of evidence of legislative intent, this is a particularly weak
ground for deviating from the centuries of unwavering adherence by American courts to the born alive
rule. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
In holding that a viable fetus was a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (despite
the Supreme Court's holding that a fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment), a federal
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recognize and protect important interests.52 Most importantly, the courts
have failed to recognize the fundamental differences between a woman
deciding to terminate her own pregnancy and a third party intruding
upon her body to end that pregnancy against her will.
To the extent that the expansion of fetal rights is the result of inade-
quate attention to the particular contexts in which those rights are
granted, courts and legislatures should take strict care to ensure that the
interests of pregnant women are not impaired by enhancing the legal sta-
tus of the fetus. Given the physical reality of the fetus as part of the preg-
nant woman, there exists an inherent potential for conflict between the
autonomy of pregnant women and any "right" granted the fetus qua fe-
tus. The law should continue to recognize the existence of the fetus insofar
as is necessary to protect the interests of the subsequently born child and
is consistent with the pregnant woman's interests, as, for example, in suits
by children against third parties for prenatal injuries. In their attempt to
protect pregnant women from violent criminal or tortious acts, however,
lawmakers should structure the laws so that they retain their focus on the
primary subject of protection-the pregnant woman. Attempts to deter the
destruction of fetuses by third parties against the will of pregnant women
should recognize that the actual physical injury is inflicted on and suffered
by the pregnant woman and that the fetus is affected only through her.
Courts should, in allowing a tort claim for the negligent destruction of a
fetus by third party, make clear that recovery is to compensate parents for
the loss of their expected and desired child.5" Similarly, an assault on a
pregnant woman that causes her to lose her pregnancy could be consid-
ered a more serious crime than an assault on a nonpregnant person in
recognition of the increased harm suffered by the woman and thereby pro-
viding the desired added deterrence."
2. The anti-abortion movement
Many anti-abortion activists strongly urge an enhanced legal status for
the fetus in nonabortion contexts. 5  Some of these activists are motivated
district court relied simply on what it perceived as a general expansion of legal rights to fetuses.
Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982). But see Harman v. Daniels, 525
F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981) (on almost identical facts, viable fetus held not a person under §
1983).
52. See supra notes 48-50.
53. Compare cases cited supra note 15 with cases cited supra note 17.
54. New Mexico recently became the first state to enact such legislation in a manner that explic-
itly focuses on protection of the pregnant woman rather than the fetus. If in the course of committing
a felony, such as rape or assault, an individual causes a pregnant woman to suffer a miscarriage, that
individual is guilty of a third degree felony. The new law stipulates that voluntarily induced abortions
are not affected. N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-3-7 (Supp. 1985).
55. For two of the more explicit, but by no means unique, expressions of the anti-abortion effort,
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by a sincere belief that a fetus is the moral equivalent of a born person.
Others recognize that greater fetal protection serves to create a general
atmosphere that is more hostile to the abortion right. Yet the fetal inter-
ests involved in the fetal rights debate differ greatly from those raised by
the issue of abortion. In the nonabortion context, the woman intends no
injury to the fetus; rather, she seeks to carry her pregnancy to term and is
likely to act with the interests of the fetus in mind. In this context, the
"state purpose" is not to preserve the life of the fetus against the pregnant
woman's will, but to prescribe a woman's behavior during her wanted
pregnancy. If the state were to deprive women of their right to choose to
have an abortion, it would impose on women a duty to bear unwanted
children; by creating fetal rights susceptible to use against pregnant
women, the state compels women who desire to bear children to reorgan-
ize their lives in accordance with judicially-defined norms of behavior.56
3. Concern for health of children
To date the expansion of fetal rights assertable against pregnant women
has been largely the product of accident and of zealous and imprecise po-
litical forces. Yet some commentators now argue that granting fetuses
rights assertable against the women bearing them serves the legitimate,
and even important, purpose of protecting the interests of the subse-
quently born child.5" Precisely because the fetus is dependent upon the
body of the woman for its continued life, these critics note, the health of
the child depends in part on the conduct of the woman during pregnancy.
They contend, therefore, that where the acts of a pregnant woman
threaten to harm her future child, the state should intervene and dictate
pregnant women's behavior.
This argument, too, misconceives the nature of the relationship between
the fetus and the pregnant woman and is insensitive to the great harm
see President Reagan's 1985 State of the Union address, in which he stated: "Abortion is either the
taking of a human life or it isn't. And if it is-and medical technology is increasingly showing that it
is-it must be stopped." Nat'l NOW Times, May 1985, at 5, col. 2; and Illinois's abortion law, in
which the legislature sets forth "the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn child is a
human being from the moment of conception" and states that the "longstanding policy of this State to
protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary
to preserve the life of the mother is impermissible only because of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
56. The potential infringements on women's liberty could actually discourage women from be-
coming pregnant, and, given certain adverse precedents, could in fact create an incentive for them to
abort. For example, a woman with an alcohol or drug problem might abort if faced with the possibil-
ity of civil commitment. Alternatively, in order to avoid being "caught" by the authorities, she might
not seek any prenatal care, thereby endangering both her own and her future child's health. Ex-
tending personhood to fetuses in nonabortion contexts thus threatens not the abortion right, but
women's freedom to bear children, and is a particularly inappropriate method for opposing Roe, 410
U.S 113.
57. See supra note 27.
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that would be inflicted on women by such an interventionist policy. A
woman should not behave during pregnancy so as to avoid any risks to the
fetus regardless of the costs to her, just as no individual should refrain
from all activities that pose any threat to her or his well-being. Rather,
the relevant question is what is in the interests of the woman, given that
she is pregnant. Allowing the state to control women's actions in the name
of fetal rights, however, reflects a view of the fetus as an entity separate
from the pregnant woman, with interests that are hostile to her interests.
In fact, by granting rights to the fetus assertable against the pregnant
woman, and thus depriving the woman of decisionmaking autonomy, the
state affirmatively acts to create an adversarial relationship between the
woman and the fetus. By separating the interests of the fetus from those of
the pregnant woman, and then examining, often post hoc, the effect on the
fetus of isolated decisions made by the woman on a daily basis during
pregnancy, the state is likely to exaggerate the potential risks to the fetus
and undervalue the costs of the loss of autonomy suffered by the woman.58
Where the woman has chosen not to exercise her right to abort her
fetus, she is likely to care deeply about the well-being of the child she will
bear. It is therefore more rational to assume that women will consider
potentially harmful effects to their children resulting from their actions
during pregnancy than to subject all women to state regulation of their
actions during pregnancy. Furthermore, because the decisions a woman
makes throughout her pregnancy depend on her individual values and
preferences, complicated sets of life circumstances, and uncertain
probabilities of daily risk, the woman herself is best situated to make these
complex evaluations.
But we should not be concerned merely with whether the state or the
woman is better situated to decide how to reconcile fetal and maternal
interests. Another fundamental issue is who has the right to make the
value choices required to decide such questions. By substituting its judg-
ment for that of the woman, the state deprives women of their right to
control their lives during pregnancy-a right to liberty and privacy pro-
tected by the Constitution. Furthermore, by regulating women as if their
lives were defined solely by their reproductive capacity, the state perpetu-
ates a system of sex discrimination that is based on the biological differ-
ence between the sexes, thus depriving women of their constitutional right
to the equal protection of the laws. Lawmakers should carefully consider
the liberty and equality interests at stake, as well as the value of the state
involvement, before imposing intrusive regulations on pregnant women in
the name of fetal protection.
58. See infra note 68.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RECOGNITION OF FETAL
RIGHTS
A. The Fetus and the Constitution
The Supreme Court has never considered the possible deleterious effects
of granting fetal rights in nonabortion contexts on women's exercise of
their constitutional rights. In recognizing a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion, however, the Court did make a number of relevant ob-
servations.59 In Roe v. Wade, the Court acknowledged that fetuses differ
from persons in very basic and legally relevant ways, and that the exten-
sion of rights to fetuses reflects an affirmative value choice by the state not
compelled by biological fact.6" The Court rejected the notion that the state
could avoid the great complexities involved in determining the legal status
of the fetus simply by equating the fetus with a person. In holding that
the state could not adopt a concept of the fetus that conflicted with the
right of women to terminate their pregnancies, the Court stated: "In view
of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 1
B. Infringements of Women's Liberty and Privacy
Vesting fetuses with rights that are assertable against the women bear-
ing them would create an unprecedented intrusion on women's bodies and
personal lives. The magnitude of the intrusion on women's rights
threatened by the current expansion of fetal rights implicates basic consti-
tutional liberty and privacy interests that have been recognized by the
Court in Roe and in other cases. The Court has long held that the Consti-
tution protects certain aspects of personal autonomy from state interven-
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Yet the Court's discussion in Roe clearly is not determina-
tive of the constitutionality of fetal rights in nonabortion contexts. The Court did not fully analyze the
nature of the relationship between the fetus and the woman, nor did it address the equality concerns
raised by restrictions on access to abortion given that only women, and not men, are subject to those
restrictions. Furthermore, the factors relevant in determining the legal status of the fetus in nonabor-
tion contexts are significantly different from those considered in Roe. See supra text accompanying
notes 55-56; infra note 82. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lo*er court has fully considered the
threat that legal recognition of the fetus poses to women's constitutional rights of liberty and privacy
and to the equal protection of the laws.
60. These implications naturally arise from Roe's holding that even a viable fetus is not a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and are further supported by the Court's discussion of the legal
status of the fetus in nonabortion contexts. 410 U.S. at 161-62. See supra text accompanying notes
2-4.
61. 410 U.S. at 162. In Roe, the Court held that the state's interest in the "potentiality for life" of
the fetus becomes compelling after viability and can be used to restrict third trimester abortions that
are not necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 163-64. The Court defined a
viable fetus as one "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id.
at 160 (citing L. HELI.MAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTmRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971)). For
further discussion of the viability standard, see infra note 82.
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tion. The Court has described the "right to be left alone" as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." 2
This right is particularly important when the state intervention involves a
physical intrusion on an individual's body: "No right is held more sacred,
[n]or is more carefully guarded. . . than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person."6 The right to be free from
government control of one's physical person has been described as the
right to "personal privacy and dignity,".. "personal security, '65 and "bod-
ily security and personal privacy."166
There have been few attempts at state intrusion of the magnitude and
sweeping nature involved in state regulation of pregnant women's ac-
tions.8 7 Courts have held unconstitutional even isolated instances of the
type of intrusions to which pregnant women would be continually sub-
jected.6s For example, the Supreme Court has held that the state may not
62. In an often-quoted dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis wrote: "The makers
of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted
in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (Constitution prohibits making private possession of
obscene matter a crime).
63. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (under common law, court has no
power to require plaintiff in tort action to submit to surgical examination for purpose of verifying
injuries), quoted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). The Court further stated, "'The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."' Union Pac. Ry., 141
U.S. at 251 (citation omitted).
In discussing the scope of the right to "personal security" as protected by the Fourth Amendments
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, the Court stated, "We have recently held that 'the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Tery,
392 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted).
64. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
65. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic liberties so protected
[substantively by the Fourteenth Amendment] was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief
for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.").
66. Winston v. Lee, 105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985), afflg 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983) (involuntary
removal of bullet from suspect unconstitutional; decided on Fourth Amendment grounds, but lower
court noted could be decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds); see also Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible pumping of criminal suspect's stomach violates substantive protection of
Fourteenth Amendment); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) ("The constitutional terms 'life, liberty, and property' . . . have a normative
dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to respect.
Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain
categories of common-law rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are
limits on governmental authority to abolish 'core' common-law rights . . . .") (footnotes omitted).
67. It is significant that the types of restrictions that would be imposed on pregnant women far
exceed any that we as a culture would allow children to impose on parents. For example, we would
not compel an individual to move to a different climate if her or his child's health required it and we
would not permit a child to sue her or his parents for deciding not to relocate.
68. The privacy and autonomy cases and doctrines discussed herein deal exclusively with regula-
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compel criminal suspects to undergo certain medical procedures, 9 and a
federal circuit court has recognized the right of even involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients to refuse medical treatment.7 0 The fact that these pro-
tions that "directly" infringe on protected interests, either by making criminal certain behavior, or by
actually forcing the individual to engage in or refrain from specified behavior through the use of the
injunctive power of the state. It might be argued that privacy and autonomy rights are not as clearly
threatened by a more "indirect" regulation, namely, the threat of post-natal civil liability. This sort of
"deterrent" regulation was involved in such cases as the denial of child custody, see supra text accom-
panying note 22, and actions for damages against the mother by the child, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 18-20. Though the threat to a woman's autonomy may not be as immediately apparent in
post-natal cases as in cases involving criminal sanctions or direct state appropriation of a woman's
body, the threat is, nevertheless, just as severe. Fear of liability for damages or of the denial of child
custody obviously could have an enormous impact on a woman's behavior.
The potential impact is intensified by the fact that the standards for behavior are not likely to be as
clearly delineated as in the more "direct" cases. Women would be at the mercy of an undefined and
ever-developing common law. Not only are the standards of the state common law courts constantly
changing and often incoherent, but also women would confront varying jury conceptions of "reasona-
ble" behavior. Given common stereotypical public conceptions of the "proper" role of women, particu-
larly pregnant women, there is very little behavior that might not be found by a jury to be "unreason-
able." This is particularly a risk when juries are confronted with injuries that will otherwise go
unremedied, as is likely often to be true in such cases. It would not, in fact, be "unreasonable" for a
pregnant woman, faced with the prospect of post-natal civil liability according to community stan-
dards of propriety, to assume that the only safe course of behavior is to lie prone for nine months.
Thus, the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" sanctions in the fetal rights context is a distinc-
tion without a difference. The actual diminution of women's autonomy to make decisions is just as
severe whether the regulation is immediate or merely lurking in some vague threat of future penalties.
69. For example, in Rochin v. California, the Court held that the forcible pumping of a criminal
suspect's stomach violated the individual's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and was "con-
duct that shocks the conscience." 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). This was true despite the fact that the
individual was a criminal suspect; police officers witnessed the suspect swallow two pills, which they
believed to be narcotics, in an attempt to hide them from the officers; the stomach pumping involved
an isolated instance of intrusion; and the Court stressed that it must review criminal convictions from
state courts "with due humility," id. at 168.
In Winston v. Lee, the Court held that to remove surgically a bullet from a suspect's body against
his will for use as evidence against him would violate his constitutional rights. 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
The Court considered "[whether] the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy
interests at stake," id. at 1616-17 and stated "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's
body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the
intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime," id. at 1616. The Court
found the proposed surgery to be an "unreasonable" intrusion even though the risks of general anes-
thesia were considered "minimal" in this case, id. at 1618 n.7, and the Court noted, "whether the
surgery is to be characterized in medical terms as 'major' or 'minor' is not controlling," id. at 1618
n.8.
Although the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California held that the state could compel an indi-
vidual to take a blood test, the Court stated it could do so only if it could demonstrate that it was
necessary to perform the test immediately or else the evidence would be lost, thereby making it impos-
sible to obtain a search warrant. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Court stressed, moreover, the very limited
application of this case:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present
record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we
today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's
body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. at 772.
70. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the substantive right to refuse
medical treatment derives from the constitutional right to liberty and is not extinguished if an individ-
ual is committed involuntarily to a mental institution. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (reaffirm-
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hibited attempts at intrusions have involved those over whom the state
traditionally exerts a great deal of authority-criminal defendants and
mental patients-suggests the radical nature of the fetal rights trend and
its incompatibility with our heritage of civil liberties." One judge, concur-
ring in an order compelling a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean
section, acknowledged this anomaly: "The power of a court to order a
competent adult to submit to surgery is exceedingly limited. Indeed, until
this unique case arose, I would have thought such power to be
nonexistent.17
2
Although this judge suggests that protecting the life of the fetus should
represent a unique exception to the state's traditional deference to adults'
personal decisions, the law suggests the opposite: The protection against
state intrusion afforded by the Constitution is especially strong where is-
sues of childbearing are involved. The Supreme Court, in a long line of
cases, has affirmed, as part of the constitutional "right of personal pri-
vacy," 73 an individual's right to "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions,"''  at "the very heart" of which lie decisions in mat-
ters of childbearing.75 Because the Court has emphasized that the right of
ing constitutional right to refuse drugs). The court quoted a state court as follows: "'[L]iberty in-
cludes the freedom to decide about one's own health. This principle need not give way to medicaljudgment.'" Id. at 847 (quoting In re KKB, 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Ok. 1980)). Even when involuntarily
committed, "the patient's liberty is diminished only to the extent necessary to allow for confinement
by the state so as to prevent him from being a danger to himself or to others." Id. at 843.
71. A number of state courts have held that the right to refuse medical treatment as protected by
the right to privacy extends to situations where the treatment is necessary to preserve the patient's life.
As one court stated, "The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the
sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value
of life . . . is lessened . . . by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice."
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(1977) (footnote omitted). One court has stated that, even when an individual is mentally incompetent,
because the right to refuse medical treatment is a "very personal right to control one's own life," the
correct standard to be used in deciding whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment "is not what a
reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under the circumstances but what the particu-
lar patient would have done if able to choose for himself." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-61, 486
A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985). See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. of Northampton County 1973).
72. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 89, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460
(1981) (Hill, J., concurring) (per curiam).
73. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (right to use contraceptives).
74. Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
75. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. "[Tlhe Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State." Id. at 687. Significantly, the Court has charac-
terized the right to privacy as protecting autonomy in "matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas, it has been held
that there are limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct." Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to
use contraceptives; applied to married individuals); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
marry); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to purchase and use contraceptives; applied to
unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to. abortion); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to purchase and use contraceptives; applied to minors under
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privacy is the right to make decisions free from state intrusion, not only is
the state prohibited from infringing directly on the protected right, but it
also may not act in any way to interfere with the individual's decision-
making autonomy. For example, although there is no "independent fun-
damental 'right of access to contraceptives,' ,,71 state restrictions on access
to contraception must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state in-
terest, because they infringe on the "exercise of the constitutionally pro-
tected right of decision in matters of childbearing . . .
Just as the state may not force a woman to bear a child against her
will, it may not act to penalize her for deciding to bear a child. In Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFleur,8 the Court found unconstitutional
a rule that required pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity
leave for the five months prior to an expected childbirth. Noting that
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," the Court stated that "[b]y acting to penalize the pregnant
teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave reg-
ulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected
freedoms." ' 9 By creating fetal rights that can be used against the woman
bearing the fetus to restrict her conduct, the state appropriates a woman's
right to control her actions and imposes a burden at least as great as that
imposed in LaFleur.
In determining how great a burden a state regulation imposes on pri-
vacy interests, courts often focus on the intrusiveness of the necessary
sixteen years of age); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry). The Court has
further stated: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (emphasis in original).
76. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688.
77. Id. Similarly, the Court held that a statute that placed restrictions on the right of individuals
obligated to pay child support to marry was unconstitutional in that it "significantly" interfered with
the right to marry, part of the "fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978). In addition to hold-
ing that the state may not prohibit abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court has also
held unconstitutional statutes that infringe on a woman's right to choose to abort. See, e.g., Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-200 (1973) (Court struck down as "unduly restrictive" statutory require-
ments that all abortions be performed in accredited hospitals, be approved by committee of at least
three members of hospital's staff and two physicians in addition to woman's physician, and be re-
stricted to state residents); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-71, 75-79 (1976) (Court
held unconstitutional statutory requirement of spousal consent for abortions and statutory prohibition
of saline amniocentesis as method of abortion); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of
Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Court held unconstitutional various provisions of abortion statute, in-
cluding mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period before performance of any abortion, requirement
that post first trimester abortions be performed in hospital, "informed consent" provision, and re-
quirement concerning disposition of remains of abortions).
78. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
79. Id. at 639-40.
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means of enforcement. In Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, the
Court held that a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the
right to privacy in part because the state intrusions necessary for enforce-
ment would be tremendous.80 Similarly, in order to enforce fetal rights or
state regulations dictating behavior during pregnancy, the state would nec-
essarily intrude in the most private areas of a woman's life. The state
would have to police what a woman ate and drank, the types of physical
activity in which she engaged, with whom and how often she had sexual
intercourse, and where she worked-to name only a few areas of regula-
tion. The enforcement of direct state regulation of pregnant women's ac-
tions, as in cases involving court-ordered medical treatment against the
pregnant woman's wishes, would require the state forcibly to take the
pregnant woman into physical custody in order to impose the ordered
action.
In order to withstand the strict scrutiny necessitated by the infringe-
ments on women's constitutional rights to liberty and privacy, any state
recognition of fetuses that operates to the detriment of women must be
necessary to protect a compelling state interest. 81 That is, not only must
the law promote a compelling state interest, but it must also be narrowly
tailored to do so in the manner that is least intrusive on protected rights.
Laws that attempt to regulate the actions of pregnant women by creating
fetal rights clearly do not survive this standard.82 Rather, they allow pre-
80. The Court wrote, "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
81. When a law infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right or involves a suspect classifica-
tion, the courts must apply strict scrutiny in evaluating its constitutional validity. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). The law must be narrowly tailored so as not to
infringe unduly on the protected freedom, and the means selected must be the least intrusive available:
[Sitrict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of valid-ity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a 'heavy burden of justification,'
that the State must demonstrate that [the law] has been structured with 'precision,' and is
'tailored' narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the 'less drastic means'
for effectuating its objectives.
Id. at 16-17; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.").
82. Those advocating state regulation of pregnant women's actions might argue that the "potenti-
ality for life" of the viable fetus qualifies as a compelling state interest that justifies giving the fetus
rights that can be used against the pregnant woman in nonabortion contexts. The "logical and biologi-
cal justifications" for drawing the line at viability discussed by the Court in Roe, however, are simply
nonexistent in the fetal rights context. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 55-56,
the concerns in nonabortion contexts differ significantly from those present in the abortion context.
When restricting access to abortions after viability, the state seeks to prevent the destruction of a fetus
that, by definition, has the potential to live outside of the woman's womb. In the nonabortion context,
the state seeks to create fetal rights out of a concern for the health of the fetus, and, where those rights
are contingent upon live birth, the health of its future citizens. It seeks to further this interest by
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 599, 1986
cisely the type of unnecessarily sweeping state intrusion upon basic indi-
vidual rights that the Constitution prohibits. To deprive women of their
right to control their actions during pregnancy is to deprive women of
their legal personhood.
C. Fetal Rights and Sex Equality
Existing liberty and privacy doctrine recognizes the threat to pregnant
women's autonomy posed by fetal rights laws. Yet existing doctrine does
not describe the full extent of the injury involved, for it does not identify
the sex-specific nature of that injury. Only women can suffer the great
intrusions of such laws, for only women have the ability to bear children.
Fetal rights laws would not only infringe on constitutionally protected lib-
erty and privacy rights of individual women, they would also serve to dis-
advantage women as women by further stigmatizing and penalizing them
on the basis of the very characteristic that historically has been used to
perpetuate a system of sex inequality.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects in-
dividuals from discrimination that is based on their membership in a dis-
advantaged group. It is now well established that the equal protection
substituting its judgment for that of the pregnant woman concerning how she should behave during
pregnancy and by preventing her from acting in ways that it views as posing unacceptable risks to the
health of the fetus. As this Note has argued, this asserted state interest fails to qualify as compelling,
and, in fact, is clearly illegitimate. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (invalidating
restriction of constitutional right to travel, stating, "[i]f a law has 'no other purpose. . . than to chill
the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them then it [is]
patently unconstitutional' ") (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
Furthermore, viability is a meaningless distinction in the fetal rights context because the state's
interest in the health of its future citizens is equally strong throughout pregnancy. Drawing a line at
the third trimester would be an ineffective means of preventing unintentional harm to the fetus result-
ing from the behavior of the pregnant woman. In fact, the woman's actions have the greatest impact
on the development of the fetus during the first trimester of pregnancy, during most of which time she
typically does not know that she is pregnant. Trying to enforce the viability distinction in cases of
prenatal injury due to the woman's behavior during pregnancy also presents huge problems of proof,
as it would require identifying a specific point at which a woman's actions harmed the fetus. Thus,
viability is an arbitrary point at which to begin restricting the woman's actions in these contexts.
In fact, application of the viability requirement in nonabortion contexts has actually hindered the
courts from protecting the ability of born children to recover damages from third parties for injuries
inflicted prenatally. When recognizing fetal rights contingent upon live birth and against third parties,
courts sometimes feel constrained by the viability distinction drawn in Roe and by potential conceptual
conflicts with the abortion right. See, e.g., supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Continuing to
view this legal recognition as protecting the interests of born children and their parents would elimi-
nate those constraints. For example, allowing recovery for prenatal injuries against third parties as
compensation for real harm that the born child presently suffers reveals that the injury is identical
whether it was inflicted before or after the attainment of viability, thus permitting more complete
protection. Recognizing this, many courts have abandoned the viability distinction in cases involving
prenatal injuries, see PROSSER & KEraON, supra note 8, at 369, and one court has allowed a child to
sue a pharmaceutical company for personal injuries resulting from damage to its mother's chromo-
somes that occured prior to conception. Jorgensen v. Meade-Johnson Labs., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973).
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clause protects women from discrimination on the basis of sex. 3 Current
doctrine, however, offers women no protection against discrimination that
is based on real biological differences between women and men, and in
fact denies that such discrimination is sex-based. Women are granted
equal protection of the laws only to the extent that they are "similarly
situated" to men. In the contexts of both equal protection and Title VII
challenges, the Court has stated that discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy does not discriminate against women, but rationally discriminates
between pregnant people and nonpregnant people." Through its passage
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Congress immediately rejected the
Court's position for purposes of employment discrimination under Title
VII."5 This Act amended Title VII's definition of sex discrimination to
include pregnancy-related discrimination. Yet the Court has not to date
reevaluated its holding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimi-
nation for purposes of equal protection analysis. Unless the Court reverses
itself, it is likely to uphold, without even employing heightened scrutiny,
any unequal treatment of the sexes that is predicated on the reproductive
difference, regardless of the magnitude of the harm imposed on women.
By blindly applying a requirement that the groups being compared be
similarly situated, and by viewing reproductive differences as a permissi-
ble basis for differential treatment, the Court has substituted misguided
formalism for what should be the true goal of equal protection analysis in
cases of alleged discrimination-that is, to prevent the state from system-
atically disadvantaging on the basis of an immutable characteristic a class
of people who historically have been disadvantaged on the basis of that
83. Laws that discriminate on the basis of sex are currently subject to "intermediate scrutiny," a
standard that requires that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). The Court has never articulated clearly why "strict scrutiny," the more stringent
standard used for race, should not also apply for sex. In fact, in an earlier decision, four Justices had
ruled that sex should be regarded as a suspect class and strict scrutiny applied. Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion). In a recent decision, the Court invalidated a
sex-based classification as not surviving intermediate scrutiny, and stated "we need not decide whether
classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982).
84. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (equal protection); General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976) (Title VII).
85. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act reads in relevant part:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employ-
ment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. . ..
While Gilbert was effectively overruled by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Geduldig remains con-
trolling for purposes of equal protection analysis.
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characteristic.88 In the race context, the standard for equal protection
analysis that requires that similarly situated people be treated the same
generally functions well as a proxy for the goal of avoiding the real harm
of detrimental discriminatory treatment under the law. In most cases, skin
color is irrelevant and attempts to classify according to race are properly
suspect.8
7
The ability to bear children is to sex discrimination what dark skin is to
race discrimination. It is the immutable characteristic that distinguishes
the disadvantaged from the advantaged and which historically has been
used to justify the subordination of the disadvantaged. Yet the similarly
situated model designed for race is simply inappropriate in cases of sex
discrimination. 8 In the case of sex, it is a dissimilar situation"' that has
been used to erect and justify a system of male dominance. By dismissing
claims of sex discrimination on the grounds that the sexes are differently
situated in matters of reproduction, the Court rationalizes differential
treatment of the sexes as legitimate and as merely "reflecting" the fact of
biological difference. In fact, it is society's disvaluing of that difference,
and not its mere existence, that has created the existing inequalities be-
tween the sexes.90
86. Several leading scholars have written persuasively in support of such an anti-caste approach.
See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Dimond, The
Anti-Cast Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L.
REV. 1 (1983); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
87. There may be some relatively rare instances where blacks and whites are not similarly situ-
ated in some sense, as, for example, when there exist statistical differences between the races that
might be useful for determining insurance rates. Race remains an impermissible basis for classification
in these cases, despite its relevance, as a result of our larger commitment to securing equality. In cases
of affirmative action, on the other hand, differential treatment on the basis of an otherwise forbidden
classification is permitted because its object is to reduce the targeted harm.
88. For insightful discussions of the shortcomings of current equal protection analysis as applied
to sex, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); C. MACKIN-
NON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 101-41
(1979).
89. The reproductive difference between the sexes is occasionally of great relevance and legiti-
mately legally cognizable. Women's ability to bear children is essential to the survival of humankind
and should be accomodated and rewarded. It is only when that ability is used to disadvantage women
that it is an impermissible basis for legal action. See Law, supra note 88, at 1007-40; Note, Employ-
ment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 929-30 (1985)
(arguing Title VII as amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires "not only comparable
treatment [for female employees], but that measure of institutional accomodation necessary to bear
children without forfeiture of employment opportunites").
90. Although the reproductive difference is the one significant biological difference between the
sexes, as is frequently observed, "women's reproductive situation is never the result of biology alone,
but of biology mediated by social and cultural organization." R. PETCHEsKY, ABORTION AND Wo-
MAN'S CHOICE 5 (1984). See also S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 3-41 (1974).
Not only does the Court refuse to recognize equality claims based on reproductive difference, it also
continues to confuse socially-created, sex-based stereotypes with natural, biological differences be-
tween the sexes. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding Califor-
nia's statutory rape law making it criminal for any man, regardless of age, to have sex with minor
woman, but imposing no penalties on women for having sex with minor men); Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347 (1979) (upholding statute that permitted unmarried mothers to bring tort claims for wrong-
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State and social regulations concerning reproductive differences have
served to create and reinforce separate and unequal sex-segregated spheres
in the United States. Women's ability to bear children has been used to
systematically disadvantage women by defining their "proper" role in
terms of that ability. Social determinations concerning the reproductive
difference underlie our present patriarchal society in which men and male
norms have dominated the "public" sphere, the locus of political and eco-
nomic power, while women have been relegated to the "private" sphere,
where they provide the socially-necessary but socially-unrewarded work of
care for children and home.91 Conformity to prescribed sex roles has been
accomplished through the imposition of economic, social and legal con-
straints, such as protectionist legislation. For example, in the past the
Court has upheld restrictions placed on the hours women could work,
citing a "public interest" in protecting the well-being of the fetus.92 The
Court has also upheld the exclusion of women from the legal profession,
citing the "wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of men
ful death of their children but denied unmarried fathers the right to bring such claims); see also Law,
supra note 88, at 987-1002. Law writes that these "cases illustrate more than the Court's consistent
confusion of biology with the social consequences of biology. They also demonstate the breakdown in
current sex equality doctrine that occurs when the Court reviews a classification that, in its view, is
based upon biological differences." Id. at 1001.
The Court also trivializes the impact on women's lives of laws that use women's biology in ways
that disadvantage them. In failing to recognize the equality interests raised by the social treatment of
the reproductive difference, the Court acts as if "women need only be treated as persons when they
are not engaged in their childbearing function." Scales, Towards a FeministJurisprudence, 56 INDI-
ANA L.J. 375, 398 (1981).
By so doing, the Court ignores the effects of centuries of such disadvantaging. Women cannot
be separated thus from their reproductive capacity, and laws that disadvantage women on thebasis of that difference inevitably will affect all aspects of their lives. Because pregnancies
occur in women's bodies, the continued possibility of an 'unwanted' pregnancy affects womenin a very specific sense, not only as potential bearers of fetuses but also in their capacity to
enjoy sexuality and maintain health. A woman's right to decide on abortion, and, it follows, on
childbearing issues when her health and sexual self-determination are at stake is 'nearly allied
to her right to be.' Reproduction affects women as women; it transcends class divisions andpenetrates everything: work, political and community involvements, sexuality, creativity, and
dreams.
R. PETCHESKY, supra at 5.
91. See generally Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL
AMERICA 87-113 (1984).
92. In Muller v. Oregon, the Court upheld a statute that restricted the hours women could workbut did not place similar restrictions on men. The Court used as a rationale for this differential anddearly disadvantageous treatment a "public interest" in protecting the well-being of the fetus through
preserving the health of women:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at adisadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the bur-dens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the
medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day today, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well- being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
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and women." 93 The "burdens necessarily borne by women for the preser-
vation of the race" were even used as an excuse to justify exempting
women from paying poll taxes if they "chose" not to vote, thus discourag-
ing women from participating in the political process.
94 More recently,
the Court upheld a statute exempting all women from compulsory jury
duty in recognition of women's "special responsibilities" in the home.
95
The social and legal treatment accorded women's reproductive capacity
will inevitably shape the status of women in the United States. Despite
the Court's pronouncements to the contrary, laws that disadvantage peo-
ple on the basis of pregnancy disadvantage only women. Given that
women's ability to bear children historically has served as the primary
justification for denying women equality, courts should scrutinize with
particular care laws that deal with matters of reproduction to ensure that
they do not operate to the detriment of women. Equal protection doctrine
should incorporate the approach advocated by Professor Sylvia Law. Law
proposes that "laws governing reproductive biology be scrutinized by
courts to ensure that (1) the law has no significant impact in perpetuating
either the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints
on individual freedom or (2) if the law has this impact, it is justified as
the best means of serving a compelling state purpose."
96
Granting rights to fetuses in a manner that conflicts with women's au-
tonomy reinforces the tradition of disadvantaging women on the basis of
their reproductive capability. By subjecting women's decisions and actions
during pregnancy to judicial review, the state simultaneously questions
women's abilities and seizes women's rights to make decisions essential to
93. In Bradwell v. Illinois, the Court upheld a decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois to
prohibit women from practicing law, relying on the "natural" differences between the sexes:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman . . . .The constitution of the family or-
ganization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indi-
cates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of wo-
manhood . . . [T]he paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things.
83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
94. "In view of burdens necessarily borne by them for the preservation of the race, the State
reasonably may exempt [women] from poll taxes." Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937).
95. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S 57, 62 (1961). The Florida statute in question exempted all women
from jury duty unless they registered with the clerk a desire to be placed on the jury list. This
exclusion resulted in only 220 women volunteering for jury duty in a county with approximately
46,000 registered female voters in the year 1957. Id. at 64. Despite this great discrepancy, the Court,
noting that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life," held that the state consti-
tutionally could permit women to determine if jury duty was consistent with their own "special re-
sponsibilities." Id. at 62.
96. Law, supra note 88, at 1008-09. Law says further: "Given how central state regulation of
biology has been to the subjugation of women, the normal presumption of constitutionality is inappro-
priate and the state should bear the burden of justifying its rule in relation to either proposition." Id.
at 1009.
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their very personhood. The rationale behind using fetal rights laws to con-
trol the actions of women during pregnancy is strikingly similar to that
used in the past to exclude women from the paid labor force and to con-
fine them to the "private" sphere. Fetal rights could be used to restrict
pregnant women's autonomy in both their personal and professional lives,
in decisions ranging from nutrition to employment, in ways far surpassing
any regulation of the actions of competent adult men. The state would
thus define women in terms of their childbearing capacity, valuing the
reproductive difference between women and men in such a way as to
render it impossible for women to participate as full members of society.97
In light of the great threat to women's right to equality posed by legal
recognition of the fetus, the state should bear the burden of ensuring that
any law granting fetal rights does not disadvantage women or in any way
infringe on the autonomy of pregnant women.
97. In discussing the potential effects of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would label
the fetus a legal person under the Constitution, one commentator has noted:
[Women] might be required to lead less active life-styles in order to preserve the life of a
conceptus (or possible conceptus). The interests of the conceptus will often diverge from those
of the woman in such matters. From the standpoint of the conceptus, a passive carrier who
exposes it to the minimum risk of miscarriage or prenatal injury is preferred. She should not
smoke, drink, or use any drugs with possible adverse effects on the conceptus. Skiing, working
in hazardous environments, flying, and riding in automobiles might be prohibited for such
women in order to minimize possible adverse effects on the conceptus. Indeed, the Victorian
regime for upper-class pregnant women that miniizes activities either inside or outside the
home might be ideal.
Westfall, supra note 27, at 111. Another commentator noted that, in addition to the above, "maternal
discretion to. . . engage in immoderate exercise or sexual intercourse. . . or reside at high altitudes
for a prolonged period might be limited." Parness, supra note 27, at 500. Such restrictions might not
be limited to pregnant women, but might be extended to all women as "potentially pregnant": "Re-
stricting the activities of potentially pregnant women might similarly be justified on the ground that
such classification is necessary to protect the conceptus during the period between conception and
proof of pregnancy." Westfall, supra note 27, at 111.

